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家族財富研究室

體系總覽：這門知識由哪些部分組成

分析單位與當事人的目的、世代、法律材料、治理、工具，這五組有先後；稅與監理透明同時作用在每一組上；最後由爭議與執行檢驗前面的安排。

約 9 分鐘體系14筆出處
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一份把父親手上的股份移轉給三個子女的方案，動到的東西通常包括公司法的股東協議、信託法的受託人義務、家事法的夫妻財產制，以及遺產及贈與稅的申報時點。Means 在 2026 年的《家族企業法原理》裡把它列成三條原則之一，叫整合：公司法、信託與遺產法、家事法可能同時適用於同一件事，所以當事人之間的契約約定與忠實義務，應該跨部門作一致的解釋與適用。1只查公司法那一段，股東協議可以擬得完備，夫妻財產制與贈與稅的申報時點不會出現在那份文件裡。

這些部門之間確實有先後。談的是誰的財富、他要什麼，這件事沒定下來，後面的討論會退化成術語交換；世代階段沒定下來，同一個工具在做什麼也講不清楚。先後只排到工具為止。稅與監理透明排不進去，它們同時作用在前面每一組上。最後還有一組，爭議與執行，前面的安排到那裡才知道撐不撐得住。

誰的財富，他要什麼

「這一家算不算家族企業」聽起來像入門問題，答案卻決定後面所有的數字。Colli 的家族企業經濟史指出，質化的判準（所有權與控制是否同屬一家、家族有沒有參與策略決策、有沒有跨代延續的意圖）與量化的判準（持股門檻、家族成員擔任管理職的比例、已經歷幾代）不必然一致，定義換一個，同一個經濟體的家族企業家數可以從四百萬家跳到兩千萬家以上（占全體企業逾九成），對國民生產毛額的貢獻則從 12% 變成 49%。23要確定的還有更基本的事：談的是還綁在企業裡的股權，還是賣掉事業之後的一筆投資組合。兩者的問題清單幾乎不重疊。Tagiuri 與 Davis 1982 年的三圈模型把家族、所有權、經營畫成三個互相重疊的圓，重疊處形成七個扇區，一個在公司上班又持股的女兒、一個持股但不參與經營的堂弟、一個不是家族成員的總經理，立場天生不同。4後面每一組出現的衝突，位置都能在這張圖上找到。

三圈模型講的是研究者怎麼界定家族企業，它不回答當事人要什麼。傳承、控制、隱私、稅負、家族和睦、慈善，這幾個目的各自指向不同的工具，而且彼此衝突：要控制就得保留權力，權力留太多，法院會當財產還是委託人的；要隱私就會遇上實益所有權的登記義務。目的沒有先寫下來，事後就沒有判斷方案好不好的標準。

世代與發展階段

同一個工具在不同世代做的事不一樣。Gersick 等人 1997 年的模型分成所有權、家族、企業三個發展面向，每個面向各有自己的階段順序，也各走各的速度。5所有權從單一控制股東走向手足合夥，再走向堂表親財團；家族從年輕創業家庭走到子女入行、世代協作、交棒；企業從草創走到擴張與制度化，再到成熟。三者不必同步，一家公司內部不同部門也可能各自處在不同階段。Basco 在 2024 年的教科書裡再往下分，接班這件事本身還可以分成所有權、治理、經營、家族四項，交接的時點可以差上好幾年。6長子接了總經理，股份不會跟著自動過去，家族裡誰說話算數也還沒換人。

法律材料

法律是材料，治理與工具是用材料做出來的東西，所以它排在兩者前面。財產法要先站穩：所有權可以拆成法律上的與衡平法上的，這句話在沒有這層直覺的讀者耳裡只是咒語。繼承法決定遺囑自由到哪裡為止、特留分保護誰，大陸法系與英美法系在這裡分道。家事法決定配偶對企業股權有沒有請求權，婚前協議在家族企業裡常常是入股的前置條件。信託法本身則要比較著看：日本 1922 年制定、2006 年全面修正，中國大陸 2001 年立法而把所有權歸屬刻意留白，列支敦斯登 1926 年的人與公司法是歐陸第一個，瑞士到今天沒有本國信託法，瑞士民法第 335 條窮盡列舉家族財產的容許形態，2023 年聯邦委員會停止信託立法。跨境的部分由 1985 年海牙信託公約處理，公約 1992 年生效，7美國與法國簽了字沒有批准；8離岸法域另外用防火牆立法把外國的強制繼承與婚姻財產請求擋在門外。

治理

決策權怎麼分配，是治理要處理的事。Baron 與 Lachenauer 2021 年把所有權人手上的權力分成五項：設計（誰能當股東、控制權怎麼分）、決策、定義什麼叫成功、取得與分享資訊、移轉。9同一本書用四個房間描述治理現場：所有權人房訂規則，董事會房做判斷，經營層房執行，家族房負責情感、凝聚與人才培育，與其他三間平行。10家族企業治理最常見的失靈形態，是在餐桌上做了董事會的決定。Basco 把治理拆成所有權治理、企業治理、家族治理三塊，11判斷該不該正式化要看規模與複雜度撐不撐得起那個成本，規模不到就先上制度，制度會空轉。12至於家族憲章，Ward 2005 年編的那本書用整章講它，重點放在形成共識的過程。13至於拘束力，家族憲章在法律上不是一個類型，同一份文件裡的條款效力也不齊：股東資格、董事席次、表決門檻這幾類寫進公司章程或股東協議就依公司法與契約法生效，只留在憲章裡而管到家族成員私生活的，能不能拘束當事人是另一個問題。李錦記家族憲法兩種都有——集團股東須具李氏血緣，以及不准離婚、不准有婚外情否則失去擔任董事的資格。14Means 把這件事放回契約法的脈絡：法院承認閉鎖性公司股東協議的效力是逐步發生的，即使那些約定改動了董事會權限這種公司法的核心設計。15

工具

信託、控股公司、基金會、保險、遺囑，這些都是把決定落地的裝置。工具的形狀被兩件事決定：手上有哪些法律材料，以及稅怎麼課。Colli 的史料裡，義大利在 1930 年代萬能銀行模式失敗、股票市場又不發達之後，家族控制的金融控股公司成了大企業集團的頂層；金字塔式持股與層層相疊的控股結構，讓主要股東用很少的直接出資控制整家公司，還降低了被敵意併購的風險。16美國福特家族靠 B 股以約 10% 的股份掌握 39% 的表決權。17管理學的家族企業文獻大體上把這些工具當清單項處理，工具本身的規則要回到法律與稅的文獻裡讀。

稅

稅排不進層裡。一個信託，設立時課什麼、存續期間誰是納稅人、終止或分配時算誰的所得，同一組問題拿去問每個法域，答案差很多。反避稅的規則另外一套：實質課稅原則、受控外國企業式的歸屬、把擔保與代付視同分配。它同時作用在前面每一組上，而且是往回作用的——Gersick 等人 2004 年研究北美家族基金會時用一整節講稅制，1913 年開徵所得稅、戰時最高稅率一度到 94%，家族基金會的設立潮跟著出現。18稅法改起來比信託法快得多，所以這一組的答案最容易過期。

監理透明

稅決定繳多少，監理透明決定誰看得到。兩者的立法者不同、目的不同、變動速度也不同，排在一起會看不出實益所有權的登記義務其實作用在工具那一組：一個結構還剩多少意義，常常是登記義務決定的，不是稅率。OECD 的共同申報準則讓金融帳戶資訊自動交換，加密資產申報框架排定第一批法域 2026 年蒐集資料、2027 年首次申報，防制洗錢金融行動工作組織的第 24 項建議在 2022 年 3 月修訂、管的是法人，19第 25 項建議在 2023 年 2 月修訂，管的是含信託在內的法律安排。20

爭議與執行

前面每一組的安排，到訴訟裡才知道有沒有用。委託人的債權人打不打得進信託財產、繼承人的特留分請求在哪一國提出、離婚時外國法院把信託財產算不算進夫妻財產、受託人違反義務時受益人拿得到什麼救濟，最後還有一個常被略過的問題：勝訴判決拿到了，在資產所在地執行得了嗎。離岸法域的防火牆立法整組就是為這一段寫的，它擋的不是規範，是請求。跨境案子的勝負，常常在這裡分出來。

這是依賴的順序，不是規定的讀法

上面的先後講的是「哪一組不先弄清楚，下一組就講不清楚」。它不規定你從哪裡開始讀。每一章開頭都寫著它預設你已經知道什麼，讀不下去就回頭補那一章。

註釋

  1. 1Benjamin Means, The Principles of Family Business Law (Cambridge University Press, 2026)，Introduction I.4Family business law integrates consideration of corporate law, trust and estate law, and family law, as all may apply simultaneously. To the extent possible, contractual bargains and fiduciary duties among the parties should be interpreted and applied in a consistent fashion across doctrinal categories.全書的三條原則是 intimacy、integration、inheritance，整合是第二條。原文的整合清單不含稅法——該書談稅只有 8.2 一節，範圍限於估值折扣。原文
  2. 2Andrea Colli, The History of Family Business, 1850-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2003)，第 2 章 In search of a definition: quality and quantity，第 16 頁These figures need to be carefully qualified. Variations in the definition of ‘family business’ can bring considerably different results.Colli 舉的例子是 Burch 1972 年對 Berle 與 Means 的批評：私人持股在後者的定義裡是握有 80% 以上的表決權股，照這個門檻算，家族企業在美國二十世紀工業資本主義裡幾乎消失；改採「個人、家族或家族群體持有 4% 至 5% 以上資本，且有一名以上家族成員在董事會內外任職」的寬鬆定義，1965 年財星前 300 大公開發行工業公司裡約 43% 屬家族控制。原文
  3. 3Andrea Colli, The History of Family Business, 1850-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2003)，同上，第 17 至 18 頁，引 Shanker & Astrachan 1996the estimated number of family firms present in the US industrial system varies from more than 20 million (more than 90% of the total of the firms) if a ‘broad’ definition (‘some degree of family control’) is adopted, all the way down to 4 million if a much more restrictive definition (multiple generations involved; direct family involvement in strategic decisions; ‘more than one family member having managerial responsibilities’) (109–10) is employed. There is also a considerable difference in GNP contribution (49% against 12%) and employment (59% of the workforce against 15%).寬定義是「有某種程度的家族控制」，嚴格定義是「跨代參與、家族直接參與策略決策、一名以上家族成員擔任管理職」。90% 與 20% 說的是家數，49% 與 12% 說的是對國民生產毛額的貢獻，59% 與 15% 說的是就業。原文
  4. 4Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton & Lansberg, Generation to Generation (HBS Press, 1997)，第 1 章，三圈模型（引 Tagiuri & Davis 1982）Any individual in a family business can be placed in one of the seven sectors that are formed by the overlapping circles of the subsystems.原文
  5. 5Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton & Lansberg, Generation to Generation (HBS Press, 1997)，第 1 章，三維發展模型These developmental progressions influence each other, but they are also independent. Each part changes at its own pace and according to its own sequence.原文
  6. 6Rodrigo Basco, Family Business Management (Routledge, 2024)，第 10 章 10.2 Succession of what?Ownership, governance, management, and family succession could occur simultaneously or at different moments of time.Basco 把接班拆成所有權、治理、經營、家族四項，各自畫成一條連續帶。他舉的例子是福特家族：1955 年公司公開發行後家族持股被稀釋到很小的比例，但家族持有的特種股給了他們逾 40% 的表決權。原文
  7. 71985 年海牙信託公約締約狀態表（HCCH），締約狀態表，Italy 列Italy 1-VII-1985 21-II-1990 R 1-I-1992欄位依序是簽署、批准、類型、生效。義大利 1985 年 7 月 1 日簽署、1990 年 2 月 21 日批准，1992 年 1 月 1 日生效，這也是整張表上最早的生效日。原文
  8. 81985 年海牙信託公約締約狀態表（HCCH），締約狀態表，France 列與 United States of America 列France 26-XI-1991這兩國的列只有簽署欄有日期，批准、類型、生效三欄空白。美國那一列是 1988 年 6 月 13 日。原文
  9. 9Baron & Lachenauer, The Harvard Business Review Family Business Handbook (Harvard Business Review Press, 2021)，第 2 章，The five rights of family ownersDesign. Decide. Value. Inform. Transfer.Inform 的原文先講取得資訊的權利，才講決定分享給誰；私人公司的所有權人可以自己決定揭露到哪裡，上市之後這項權利大部分交出去。
  10. 10Baron & Lachenauer, The Harvard Business Review Family Business Handbook (Harvard Business Review Press, 2021)，第 4 章，The Four-Room modelIn its ideal form, an Owner Room is about power and influence, about making the rules. A Board Room is about wisdom and judgment. A Management Room is about competence and execution. A Family Room is about love, unity, and development.家族房在圖上與其他三間平行，不在它們之上——其他三間不對家族負責。
  11. 11Rodrigo Basco, Family Business Management (Routledge, 2024)，第 7 章 7.1 Introductionfamily business corporate governance comprises three different yet complementary governance structures: ownership governance, business governance, and family governance.原文
  12. 12Rodrigo Basco, Family Business Management (Routledge, 2024)，同上At the early stages of a family business, when the founder and family exert significant influence and the firm size is still manageable and governable by a few family individuals, the cost of implementing formal corporate governance could exceed the benefit.原文
  13. 13John L. Ward (ed.), Unconventional Wisdom: Counterintuitive Insights for Family Business Success (John Wiley & Sons, 2005)，第 9 章章名The Family Constitution: It's the Process That Counts同章給的 IMD 調查數字：約 15% 的後代世代家族企業說自己有家族憲章，參加 IMD「Leading the Family Business」課程的家族裡有超過一半正在寫其中一部分。Ward 對成效的判斷是寫完擱著沒人遵守的很多。
  14. 14胡誠修《兩岸家族信託法制之研究》（世新大學法學院碩士論文，104 學年度），頁 99李錦記家族憲法中規定，李錦記集團的股東必須具有李錦記家族的血緣，但不限男女。⋯⋯此外，李錦記家族憲法中，還要求家族成員「不要晚結婚、不准離婚、不准有婚外情」，否則將失去成為家族企業董事的資格。李錦記 1888 年創立，傳到第五代；2003 年設家族委員會與家族議會。同一份家族憲法裡，修改憲法本身要家族委員會四分之三多數決，一般決議過半數。
  15. 15Benjamin Means, The Principles of Family Business Law (Cambridge University Press, 2026)，第一部，私人約定一節In some respects, the gradual recognition of contractual bargaining within domestic relationships resembles the process by which courts became willing to enforce shareholder agreements in close corporations.”). 31 See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 154 (University of Chicago Press, 1979) (1765) (stating that because “husband and wife are one person in law” a contractual relationship is conceptually impossible); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 371 (1978) (arguing that courts “refused to enforce agreements between husband and wife affecting the internal organization of family life” because legal intervention is inconsistent with “successful human association [that] depends upon spontaneous and informal collaboration”). 32 See Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79, 81–82 (2001) (listing “matters such as entry into marriage, contractual ordering of marriage, nonmarital relationships, divorce, adoption, the use of reproductive technologies, and the privatization of domestic relations dispute resolution”). 3 Integrating Family and Business Values 51 obligations, not in violation of public policy.”33 Through contract, families can define their own boundaries and recognize new forms of intimacy.34 Therefore, rather than seeking to separate what is status based and what is contractual, a better approach would widen the contractual lens and take relationships as the starting point for an integrated analysis. In that regard, we should seek to establish appropriate default rules for the interpretation and enforcement of family business bargains that presuppose a relational context. The parties’ intentions, which are otherwise unclear, may be informed by the communal aspects of family life.35 Moreover, family members may not have addressed key issues in advance because actual bargaining can undermine trust.36 Properly informed, contract law could serve as a resource for the parties, generating a set of preferred outcomes and facilitating more particular bargaining.37 By overlaying simultaneously relevant business and family considerations, a contractual approach makes it possible to appreciate what is at stake in a family business. Adhering to the economic perspective described in Chapter 1, however, some might counsel a narrower view of contractual private ordering in familyowned businesses, in order to respect the supposedly “separate spheres” of intimacy and markets.38 According to this objection, family relationships are 33 Unif. Premarital & Marital Agreement Act § 3, 9C U.L.A. 373 (1983). 34 See Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 364 (2004). Even when family law rules remain mandatory, rational business participants will still take them into account. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-organization Law, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 751, 754 (2005) (“Federal tax, securities, bankruptcy laws, and some state non-organization laws are important because firms can minimize their impact only by complying or changing their transaction form.”). 35 See David Bork, Family Business, Risky Business: How to Make It Work 26 (1986) (arguing that “what is going on in the individual [is] inseparable from the family network of relationships in which the individual is embedded [and from] the emotional processes in that system”); see generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91–93 (1989) (exploring the role of courts in defining contractual obligations in the absence of explicit terms based on assumptions regarding the parties’ intentions). 36 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1805–06 (2001) (noting that parties may avoid explicit bargains in order to preserve trust). 37 See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its Context, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1031, 1045 n.52 (2004) (“The tendency of parties to accede to default rules in order to avoid the cost of contracting around them renders them ‘sticky[.]’”) (citing Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1598 (1999)). 38 See Viviana A. Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy 23 (2005) (noting that “worries about the incompatibility, incommensurability, or contradiction between intimate and impersonal relations are long-standing and persistent”). 52 Part I Theory extraneous to the nexus of business contracts because firms are economic institutions and economic actors will rationally pursue their own advantage.39 By contrast, family is an institution that protects a sphere of intimacy apart from competitive market relationships.40 Even if families could be redescribed in the language of economics,41 the typical range of family concerns may seem far removed from the narrower economic objectives of a business corporation.42 Thus, according to some scholars, the residual role of family relationships is to establish a background of trust that can reduce the transaction costs of forming and operating a firm.43 In truth, families cannot be excluded from the economic sphere, because no family can avoid economic considerations.44 The household is the original unit of economic analysis and the source of the word economics.45 Consider, for example, one successful author’s account of marital problems caused by a changed economic dynamic: 39 See Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216, 220 (1992) (“Rational individuals invest their human and money capital with a view to maximizing the value of such resources.”); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 99, 109 (1989) (noting that the contractual theory of corporate law is “based in part on the assumption that the shareholders’ primary interest is in the maximization of the value of their investments”). 40 Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443, 1522 (“[T]he values associated with a ‘successful’ family – altruism, sympathy, mutualism – were precisely those that were viewed as incompatible with success in the economic sphere.”). Also, some aspects of family life may not be commodities, or ought not to be treated as such. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1923–28 (1987). 41 See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 237 (1981) (extending the assumption of rationality to choices regarding marriage, children, and friendships); Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 169–94 (1976). 42 See Blake E. Ashforth, Role Transitions in Organizational Life: An IdentityBased Perspective 139 (2001) (“Work and home are often stereotypically perceived as opposites on many dimensions.”). 43 For instance, “if family-owned ventures reduce the agency costs of management, there will be gains for all to share.” Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 232 (1991). 44 See Zelizer, supra note 38, at 13 (“Economic transactions include all social interactions involving consumption, production, and distribution of goods, services, or the means of acquiring them – for example, when one sibling buys a car from another, an immigrant father supervises his daughter’s work in the family store, a salesman spreads free samples among his close friends, or parents lend their children money for purchase of a home.”); Piper v. Hoard, 13 N.E. 626, 629 (N.Y. 1887) (“Marriage has its sentimental and its business sides.”). 45 Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 116 Yale L.J. 226, 232 n.14 (2006) (“Although oikos [house] is the etymological root of ‘economics,’ until recent decades few economists have paid more than passing attention to home economics.”). 3 Integrating Family and Business Values 53 We expected that things would proceed one way – he’d be the primary breadwinner, a successful attorney, and I’d make less money, stay home with the kids, with fiction essentially a lucrative hobby …. When it didn’t work out that way, I think we both had a hard time rewriting the contract of the marriage.46 Whether or not a family owns and operates a business, the family must address questions of economic production and exchange and reconcile economic activity with other expectations.47 Acknowledging the economic concerns that families and businesses share should not obscure differences in their respective values. The observation that family life has an economic component is not meant to be a reductive claim that families and businesses amount to the same thing – ways of organizing to accomplish collective, largely economic purposes. In this vein, one commentator defines marriage as “a written, oral, or customary longterm contract between a man and a woman to produce children, food, and other commodities in a common household.”48 If family and business were “nothing-but” economics and their only differences concerned the goods sought by the parties, the nature of transaction costs, and the terms of the default contract, then the goal of family business law would be to provide a single, coherent conception of value, largely consistent with the law-andeconomics view of rational choice.49 However, invoking contractual principles to align family and business planning places no limits on the permissible interests of contracting parties and, therefore, does not require us to deny the distinctive values of families and businesses.50 Recall that the economists’ theory of the firm uses the building block of open-market transactions – contract – to construct an alternative to markets.51 Contract should be seen as a means of expressing values and making them 46 Rebecca Mead, Written Off: Jennifer Weiner’s Quest for Literary Respect, New Yorker, Jan. 13, 2014, at 37, 40. 47 See Zelizer, supra note 38, at 13. 48 Becker, supra note 41, at 43. 49 According to Professor Viviana Zelizer, “Impatient with stark dualisms, critics have sometimes countered separate spheres and hostile worlds accounts with reductionist nothing but arguments: the ostensibly separate world of intimate social relations, they argue, is nothing-but a special case of some general principle.” Zelizer, supra note 38, at 29. 50 See Ivan S. Lansberg, Managing Human Resources in Family Firms: The Problem of Institutional Overlap, 12 Organizational Dynamics 39, 42 (1983) (“The exchange of resources in the family is guided by implicit affective principles that focus … on the needs and long-term wellbeing of the other, rather than on the specific value of the goods and services.”). By contrast, “the norm of fairness that operates in the firm is based on the concept of merit.” Id. 51 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 311 (1976). 54 Part I Theory legally enforceable, rather than a concept that imposes values.52 Accordingly, the fact that businesses and families engage in private ordering tells us little about what it is they value and have reason to value. In a family business, the ability to choose among different plausible options is particularly important. Even if doubts remain concerning the introduction of contractual principles into supposedly nonmarket family institutions, expanding the range of available choices in the domestic sphere is not the same thing as treating family relationships as fungible, market commodities. For instance, family law scholars have explored contract as a potential mechanism for enhancing individual autonomy and for counteracting issues of gender or other social inequality.53 Depending on their situation, individuals might “use private agreements to reinforce their marital commitment”54 or to create structures for intimate relationships that fall outside existing recognized categories.55 In some respects, the gradual recognition of contractual bargaining within domestic relationships resembles the process by which courts became willing to enforce shareholder agreements in close corporations, even when those agreements altered central features of corporate law such as the authority of the board of directors.Means 把家庭領域的私人約定與閉鎖性公司的股東協議放在一起看：兩者都是一群人為了共同目的立下的安排，法院對後者的態度已經從要求形式要件走到承認其效力。原文
  16. 16Andrea Colli, The History of Family Business, 1850-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2003)，第 3 章，第 34 至 35 頁In Italy, after the 1930s, the failure of the ‘universal-bank model’ in the absence of well-developed stock markets brought the diffusion of family-controlled financial holding companies that headed the main industrial groups. As a consequence, in some cases – as in the French one before the 1980s, but above all the Italian case until now – big business had been dominated by pyramidal holdings and Chinese-boxes, enabling the main shareholders, usually also inside directors, to control the corporation with a very small direct investment of capital and a much reduced risk of hostile take-over.繼承法在同一本書另有一節，講的是家族企業為了不被分割而發展出的辦法：女兒以婚姻贈與被補償、那筆錢常年掛在公司的負債上，長子或指定接班人的權威不受挑戰，其他兒子轉任商業分支的職位，以及十九、二十世紀工業家族之間常見的堂表親通婚。原文
  17. 17Andrea Colli, The History of Family Business, 1850-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2003)，第 2 章，第 18 至 19 頁，引 Sheehan 1967at the end of the 1960s only about 10% of the outstanding shares of the Ford Motor Company were in the hands of the founder’s nephews. But they were Class B shares (i.e., with a voting power of 3,492 votes per share), which granted the Fords control of 39% of the company.同一段的另一個例子是杜邦：家族控制 Christiana Securities Ltd 的 30%，而該公司持有杜邦 29% 的股份。原文
  18. 18Gersick, Stone, Grady, Desjardins & Muson, Generations of Giving: Leadership and Continuity in Family Foundations (Lexington Books, 2004)，第 2 章，家族基金會史的第二個動因When federal income taxes were first introduced, taxpayers in the top bracket were assessed 7 percent of their income. Five years later, the top tax rate had jumped to 77 percent. Rates dropped after the stock market crash of 1929 but during the Depression and throughout World War II, Congress raised federal income taxes to what affluent individuals considered confiscatory levels. In 1945, the tax rate for the top bracket peaked at 94 percent and, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, it fluctuated between 70 percent and 92 percent.同節接著寫 1917 年國會開始允許個人所得扣除捐給教育或慈善組織的款項，上限為調整後總所得的 15%；1940 年開徵聯邦遺產稅。所得稅本身則是 1913 年第十六修正案通過後開徵。
  19. 19FATF：法人實益所有權指引（R.24）（2022 年 3 月），R.24 實益所有權指引頁，2023 年 3 月 10 日發布說明In March 2022, the FATF agreed on tougher global beneficial ownership standards in its Recommendation 24 by requiring countries to ensure that competent authorities have access to adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on the true owners of companies.原文
  20. 20FATF：法律安排（含信託）實益所有權與透明度指引（R.25）（2023 年 2 月），R.25 實益所有權指引頁，2024 年 3 月 11 日發布說明Following the February 2023 revisions to FATF Recommendation 25 on Beneficial ownership and transparency of legal arrangements, the FATF has updated its risk-based guidance for this Recommendation.原文

出處

  1. Gersick, Davis, McCollom Hampton & Lansberg, Generation to Generation (HBS Press, 1997)
  2. Baron & Lachenauer, The Harvard Business Review Family Business Handbook (Harvard Business Review Press, 2021)——所有權人五項權利與四房間治理模型的出處
  3. Rodrigo Basco, Family Business Management (Routledge, 2024)——三分治理與四重接班的出處
  4. Benjamin Means, The Principles of Family Business Law (Cambridge University Press, 2026)——公司法、信託與遺產法、家事法三部門交錯的出處
  5. Andrea Colli, The History of Family Business, 1850-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2003)——New Studies in Economic and Social History 書系；家族企業定義之爭與控制強化工具史的出處
  6. John L. Ward (ed.), Unconventional Wisdom: Counterintuitive Insights for Family Business Success (John Wiley & Sons, 2005)——IMD 高階主管教育書系；家族憲章五類政策清單的出處
  7. Gersick, Stone, Grady, Desjardins & Muson, Generations of Giving: Leadership and Continuity in Family Foundations (Lexington Books, 2004)——美國國家家族慈善中心委託研究；家族基金會三階段治理的出處
  8. The Family Firm Institute, Family Enterprise: Understanding Families in Business and Families of Wealth (John Wiley & Sons, 2014)——三系統與顧問角色類型學的出處
  9. Kets de Vries, Carlock & Florent-Treacy, Family Business on the Couch: A Psychological Perspective (John Wiley & Sons, 2007)——退場四選項與家族治理正式化階梯的出處
  10. 1985 年海牙信託公約締約狀態表（HCCH）——各國簽署、批准、生效日期逐國列明
  11. OECD：CRS 標準含 Commentary（第二版，2017）——全文公開下載
  12. OECD：CARF 與修訂版 CRS 實施公告（2024 年 10 月）——第一批法域 2026 年起蒐集資料、2027 年首次申報；nextExpected＝首次申報年，屆時查實施動態
  13. FATF：法人實益所有權指引（R.24）（2022 年 3 月）——2022 年 3 月修訂
  14. FATF：法律安排（含信託）實益所有權與透明度指引（R.25）（2023 年 2 月）——2023 年 2 月修訂